232 THE GROUNDWORK OF SCIENCE

assert we can know our " states of consciousness " more

certainly and directly than we can know the "continuously

existing self" which has them, is a most profound and

fundamental mistake.

We are at this moment writing : we feel the pen and the

motions of our hand and arm, and recognize that we have

such sensations, and that we perceive hand and arm, pen,

ink, and paper. But ordinarily, when writing, we no more

advert to such " perceptions " than we advert to our

"perceptions" when running up or down stairs. It is plain

that we do not so advert ; for as surely as our attention is so

directed, our movements in writing become hampered in the

one case, and a stumble on the staircase* is very likely to

occur in the second. Much less inconvenience ensues from

turning the mind inwards (while writing or running up or

down stairs), and recognizing our existence, than from

adverting to our bodily movements while thus occupied.

Thus here, again, we may recognize the fact that of the

two certainties, the certainty of our own existence from

moment to moment is more easily attained than the cer-

tainty as to what is the nature of the various feelings and

perceptions which may accompany the actions above referred

to, or any others.

But, as we have noted, it has been objected against the

possibility of our self-knowledge that we can never know

ourselves absolutely and unmodified, but only in some state

or under some relation. Now it is very true that we have no

intuition of our own psychical being in its essence, and apart

from any of its activities, passivities, and relations. But then

the same thing can be, and must be, said of everything else

we perceive. In fact, nothing we can in any way perceive

exists apart from everything else, or "absolutely" as it is

(in our opinion) very unreasonably termed.

* See ante, p. 1 1 8.

assert we can know our " states of consciousness " more

certainly and directly than we can know the "continuously

existing self" which has them, is a most profound and

fundamental mistake.

We are at this moment writing : we feel the pen and the

motions of our hand and arm, and recognize that we have

such sensations, and that we perceive hand and arm, pen,

ink, and paper. But ordinarily, when writing, we no more

advert to such " perceptions " than we advert to our

"perceptions" when running up or down stairs. It is plain

that we do not so advert ; for as surely as our attention is so

directed, our movements in writing become hampered in the

one case, and a stumble on the staircase* is very likely to

occur in the second. Much less inconvenience ensues from

turning the mind inwards (while writing or running up or

down stairs), and recognizing our existence, than from

adverting to our bodily movements while thus occupied.

Thus here, again, we may recognize the fact that of the

two certainties, the certainty of our own existence from

moment to moment is more easily attained than the cer-

tainty as to what is the nature of the various feelings and

perceptions which may accompany the actions above referred

to, or any others.

But, as we have noted, it has been objected against the

possibility of our self-knowledge that we can never know

ourselves absolutely and unmodified, but only in some state

or under some relation. Now it is very true that we have no

intuition of our own psychical being in its essence, and apart

from any of its activities, passivities, and relations. But then

the same thing can be, and must be, said of everything else

we perceive. In fact, nothing we can in any way perceive

exists apart from everything else, or "absolutely" as it is

(in our opinion) very unreasonably termed.

* See ante, p. 1 1 8.