46 THE GROUNDWORK OF SCIENCE

of the truth of that for which it vouches. We should thus

be reduced to a state of uncertainty and scepticism, casting

a shade of doubt over every proposition whatever. But

in such a state of mind it would indeed be a hopeless task to

seek to investigate the groundwork of science. The question

as to Idealism must therefore be examined to the extent of

our ability as a necessary preliminary for any possible satis-

factory conclusion with respect to Epistemology.

We have done our best to present the case of the Idealists

fairly. What is now to be urged on the other side ?

In the first place, as we said before, most men are not

Idealists. Indeed, the professed adherents of that system

constitute but a very small portion of the most educated part

of mankind. Secondly, even Idealists themselves cannot

help entertaining and acting on the notions common to other

men. It is not merely that they make use of ordinary

phraseology about " perception " and " things perceived,"

but they habitually as we shall shortly see give to the

terms they use the ordinary signification, and reserve their

idealistic interpretation for the time they are occupied with

philosophizing. The most distinguishing character of the

notion all men have of the reality of an extended, external

independent world, is the absolute inevitableness of that

notion, which holds sway over Idealists as well as others.

It has been said that the inevitable character of this notion

is due to " Natural Selection." Men who did not promptly

make their actions accord with it, would, it is urged, be very

quickly eliminated, and only those most ready to act as if an

independent external world existed would survive. Thus it

is that this notion has become ingrained in survivors.

But, as we shall see later on,* our firmest, clearest, most

certain and highest perceptions cannot have been due to

"Natural Selection." If, therefore, there is some efficient cause

* Chapter ix.

of the truth of that for which it vouches. We should thus

be reduced to a state of uncertainty and scepticism, casting

a shade of doubt over every proposition whatever. But

in such a state of mind it would indeed be a hopeless task to

seek to investigate the groundwork of science. The question

as to Idealism must therefore be examined to the extent of

our ability as a necessary preliminary for any possible satis-

factory conclusion with respect to Epistemology.

We have done our best to present the case of the Idealists

fairly. What is now to be urged on the other side ?

In the first place, as we said before, most men are not

Idealists. Indeed, the professed adherents of that system

constitute but a very small portion of the most educated part

of mankind. Secondly, even Idealists themselves cannot

help entertaining and acting on the notions common to other

men. It is not merely that they make use of ordinary

phraseology about " perception " and " things perceived,"

but they habitually as we shall shortly see give to the

terms they use the ordinary signification, and reserve their

idealistic interpretation for the time they are occupied with

philosophizing. The most distinguishing character of the

notion all men have of the reality of an extended, external

independent world, is the absolute inevitableness of that

notion, which holds sway over Idealists as well as others.

It has been said that the inevitable character of this notion

is due to " Natural Selection." Men who did not promptly

make their actions accord with it, would, it is urged, be very

quickly eliminated, and only those most ready to act as if an

independent external world existed would survive. Thus it

is that this notion has become ingrained in survivors.

But, as we shall see later on,* our firmest, clearest, most

certain and highest perceptions cannot have been due to

"Natural Selection." If, therefore, there is some efficient cause

* Chapter ix.