THE OBJECTS OF SCIENCE 85

imagine anything of which we have not had such experi-

ence.

But our inability to imagine such action does not con-

stitute an argument of the slightest value against the reality

of such action (in ways which are beyond our power of

imagination), if our intellect shows us good reason for

thinking that such action does, in fact, take place, and

there is no real evidence that such reciprocal action is

impossible.

But because it is felt difficult to imagine the action of

mind on matter or of matter on mind, it is a curious method

of obtaining relief to assume the unique existence of some-

thing more unimaginable (because more unknowable) than

either, and take that as a satisfactory explanation !

Matter we know and mind we know, but what is this x

underlying both, the only properties of which are the two

manifestations of existence (mental and physical), deemed

the very metaphysical antipodes of being ?

If it is difficult to understand matter and mind as re-

ciprocally active, how can the emergence of entities so

antithetical from one absolutely unique and common source

be better understood ?

We have an intuition of the extended the physical. Is

it possible that we should have a less perfect intuition of

our own consciousness? Surely our reason tells us that

we both know them both as evident existences and as

evidently profoundly different ones. This is made mani-

fest by the diversity of their activities, and this diversity

can be perceived in our own intimate, unique, concrete

being.

Suppose we are energetically opposing the entrance of

someone into the room we are in, by leaning the whole

weight of our body against the door of it. We have a

distinct intuition both of our volitional effort and intention

imagine anything of which we have not had such experi-

ence.

But our inability to imagine such action does not con-

stitute an argument of the slightest value against the reality

of such action (in ways which are beyond our power of

imagination), if our intellect shows us good reason for

thinking that such action does, in fact, take place, and

there is no real evidence that such reciprocal action is

impossible.

But because it is felt difficult to imagine the action of

mind on matter or of matter on mind, it is a curious method

of obtaining relief to assume the unique existence of some-

thing more unimaginable (because more unknowable) than

either, and take that as a satisfactory explanation !

Matter we know and mind we know, but what is this x

underlying both, the only properties of which are the two

manifestations of existence (mental and physical), deemed

the very metaphysical antipodes of being ?

If it is difficult to understand matter and mind as re-

ciprocally active, how can the emergence of entities so

antithetical from one absolutely unique and common source

be better understood ?

We have an intuition of the extended the physical. Is

it possible that we should have a less perfect intuition of

our own consciousness? Surely our reason tells us that

we both know them both as evident existences and as

evidently profoundly different ones. This is made mani-

fest by the diversity of their activities, and this diversity

can be perceived in our own intimate, unique, concrete

being.

Suppose we are energetically opposing the entrance of

someone into the room we are in, by leaning the whole

weight of our body against the door of it. We have a

distinct intuition both of our volitional effort and intention