42 THE GROUNDWORK OP SCIENCE

than other people do, they are, like other people, occupied

about "things perceived." The difference is that we, and.

most men, affirm that through our feelings the mind becomes

aware that material objects consist of extended corporeal

substance, though of that substance in itself we have no

direct knowledge, but only apprehend it through its ob-

jective qualities, the existence of which is made known to

us through our sensations.

Idealists, on the other hand, deny the reality of this un-

cognizable substance, and deny also that we can know it

to be really and objectively extended, existing apart from

the mind, and they further deny the reality of anything

apart from mind, usually seeming to mean a human mind,

though many, when pressed by argument, will postulate an

objective non-human mind and often a divine mind, as the

necessary and indispensable cause of the existence of any-

thing whatever.

Now, as before said, we have no intention of entering

upon any question touching religion in this work, but merely

of treating of such questions as seem to us necessary for

any investigation of Epistemology.

We have, therefore, no intention of denying that the ex-

istence of a divine mind is a necessary condition for the

existence of anything else, and we have just as little in-

tention of affirming it. But we are perfectly convinced that

objects and substances can, because they do, exist apart

from our own mind and apart from any mind we can have

any direct knowledge of, or even imagine, as existing.

Certainly we have no direct perception, no intuition, of

the existence of a God ; nor do we believe that such an

intuition exists in the minds of other men, while we (our

individual selves) have a direct perception, an intuition, of the

existence of a real, extended, external world existing inde-

pendently of our own mind and of any mind, as above stated.

than other people do, they are, like other people, occupied

about "things perceived." The difference is that we, and.

most men, affirm that through our feelings the mind becomes

aware that material objects consist of extended corporeal

substance, though of that substance in itself we have no

direct knowledge, but only apprehend it through its ob-

jective qualities, the existence of which is made known to

us through our sensations.

Idealists, on the other hand, deny the reality of this un-

cognizable substance, and deny also that we can know it

to be really and objectively extended, existing apart from

the mind, and they further deny the reality of anything

apart from mind, usually seeming to mean a human mind,

though many, when pressed by argument, will postulate an

objective non-human mind and often a divine mind, as the

necessary and indispensable cause of the existence of any-

thing whatever.

Now, as before said, we have no intention of entering

upon any question touching religion in this work, but merely

of treating of such questions as seem to us necessary for

any investigation of Epistemology.

We have, therefore, no intention of denying that the ex-

istence of a divine mind is a necessary condition for the

existence of anything else, and we have just as little in-

tention of affirming it. But we are perfectly convinced that

objects and substances can, because they do, exist apart

from our own mind and apart from any mind we can have

any direct knowledge of, or even imagine, as existing.

Certainly we have no direct perception, no intuition, of

the existence of a God ; nor do we believe that such an

intuition exists in the minds of other men, while we (our

individual selves) have a direct perception, an intuition, of the

existence of a real, extended, external world existing inde-

pendently of our own mind and of any mind, as above stated.