54 THE GROUNDWORK OF SCIENCE

perceived cause theistic, pantheistic, or atheistic which pro-

duces them, then everything must depend upon the action

of that agent, and all secondary causes and interactions, such

as those by which one body is supposed to act on another,

can be nothing but deceitful illusory appearances.

But since physical science largely consists in a search after

secondary causes and the laws of the interaction of bodies

one on another, a system which can have nothing to say

to either must be quite useless to such science.

It is indeed the fact that, while following their special

scientific pursuits, Idealists must, temporarily, if tacitly, abjure

their Idealism. As men of science it is impossible for them

to be Idealists, and this some of them confess, candidly

avowing that it would be absurd to try and describe scientific

processes and state scientific conclusions in Idealist phrase-

ology, while all that science needs is to describe co-existences

and successions of appearances and in no way to explain

them. But surely such avowals amount to nothing less than

a condemnation of the system which makes them necessary.

Physical science requires us to admit the absolute reality

of extended bodies which can move or be moved, and which

have real objective relations of number and position and

really act and react on one another. Newton's discovery

is much more than a mere description of appearances, and of

the theory of evolution the same may certainly be affirmed.

Any system of philosophy, therefore, which denies the objec-

tive reality of primary qualities, cannot serve as a ground-

work of science. Either physical science has no foundation

at all or its groundwork is other than idealistic.

Now, according to received Idealism the world is con-

stituted by " relations," the source of which is a " mind "

or " thinking subject."

Certainly no object can exist without relations. These are

real objective relations of which the mind is not the " source "

perceived cause theistic, pantheistic, or atheistic which pro-

duces them, then everything must depend upon the action

of that agent, and all secondary causes and interactions, such

as those by which one body is supposed to act on another,

can be nothing but deceitful illusory appearances.

But since physical science largely consists in a search after

secondary causes and the laws of the interaction of bodies

one on another, a system which can have nothing to say

to either must be quite useless to such science.

It is indeed the fact that, while following their special

scientific pursuits, Idealists must, temporarily, if tacitly, abjure

their Idealism. As men of science it is impossible for them

to be Idealists, and this some of them confess, candidly

avowing that it would be absurd to try and describe scientific

processes and state scientific conclusions in Idealist phrase-

ology, while all that science needs is to describe co-existences

and successions of appearances and in no way to explain

them. But surely such avowals amount to nothing less than

a condemnation of the system which makes them necessary.

Physical science requires us to admit the absolute reality

of extended bodies which can move or be moved, and which

have real objective relations of number and position and

really act and react on one another. Newton's discovery

is much more than a mere description of appearances, and of

the theory of evolution the same may certainly be affirmed.

Any system of philosophy, therefore, which denies the objec-

tive reality of primary qualities, cannot serve as a ground-

work of science. Either physical science has no foundation

at all or its groundwork is other than idealistic.

Now, according to received Idealism the world is con-

stituted by " relations," the source of which is a " mind "

or " thinking subject."

Certainly no object can exist without relations. These are

real objective relations of which the mind is not the " source "