THE OBJECTS OF SCIENCE 37

experience and no knowledge of anything in any object, e.g.,

in an apple, which exists underneath (so to speak) its size,

solidity, shape, colour, smell, and taste, and which supports

these qualities, but which itself can never by any possibility

be perceived. \Yhat Idealism denies, therefore, is not the

existence of that which we really perceive, and which we

habitually call ' external things.' It only denies the existence

of a something underlying what we call external things,

which ' something ' is a mere phantom, a creation of the

fancy, and cannot be attained to by any of our senses, but

is equally out of the reach of them all. If ordinary people

when they speak of any object mean to refer to what they

actually perceive (and which we cannot any of us know

otherwise than as a mere plexus of our feelings), then they

are Idealists all the time without knowing it, as Idealism

fully accepts and asserts the existence of such things so

actually perceived. Idealism does not contest the existence

of any one thing which we can feel, perceive, or even imagine

of anything which we can apprehend either by sensation or

reflexion. That things which we see with our eyes and touch

with our hands do really exist and are really known to us, it

does not in the least question. It only denies that in these

really known and existing things there is an underlying,

unknowable and unimaginable ' substance,' which in some

mysterious way supports the qualities \vhich our senses

perceive. In denying the existence of this unknown and

unknowable 'substance,' it deprives men of nothing which

they can even imagine, and therefore of nothing they can

really miss. If the word 'substance' be taken in the vulgar

sense for a collection of all the ' qualities ' quantity, shape,

weight, colour, etc., etc., which compose an object as we know

it Idealism can never be accused of taking it away, for,

according to Idealism, it is that alone which exists. But if

' substance ' be taken in a so-called ' philosophic ' sense for

experience and no knowledge of anything in any object, e.g.,

in an apple, which exists underneath (so to speak) its size,

solidity, shape, colour, smell, and taste, and which supports

these qualities, but which itself can never by any possibility

be perceived. \Yhat Idealism denies, therefore, is not the

existence of that which we really perceive, and which we

habitually call ' external things.' It only denies the existence

of a something underlying what we call external things,

which ' something ' is a mere phantom, a creation of the

fancy, and cannot be attained to by any of our senses, but

is equally out of the reach of them all. If ordinary people

when they speak of any object mean to refer to what they

actually perceive (and which we cannot any of us know

otherwise than as a mere plexus of our feelings), then they

are Idealists all the time without knowing it, as Idealism

fully accepts and asserts the existence of such things so

actually perceived. Idealism does not contest the existence

of any one thing which we can feel, perceive, or even imagine

of anything which we can apprehend either by sensation or

reflexion. That things which we see with our eyes and touch

with our hands do really exist and are really known to us, it

does not in the least question. It only denies that in these

really known and existing things there is an underlying,

unknowable and unimaginable ' substance,' which in some

mysterious way supports the qualities \vhich our senses

perceive. In denying the existence of this unknown and

unknowable 'substance,' it deprives men of nothing which

they can even imagine, and therefore of nothing they can

really miss. If the word 'substance' be taken in the vulgar

sense for a collection of all the ' qualities ' quantity, shape,

weight, colour, etc., etc., which compose an object as we know

it Idealism can never be accused of taking it away, for,

according to Idealism, it is that alone which exists. But if

' substance ' be taken in a so-called ' philosophic ' sense for