256 THE GROUNDWORK OF SCIENCE

only be reached by thoughts and must be expressed by the aid

of our thoughts.

We are far indeed from denying that unconscious activities

of various orders take place in our being ; yet, whatever

influence such activities may have, they cannot affect our

judgments save by and in thoughts. Even if a man should

become convinced that his thoughts were worthless tools, he

could only arrive at that conclusion by making use of the

very tools he declared to be worthless. What then ought his

conclusion to be worth even in his own eyes ?

We can never justify reason, because we must employ

reason in criticising and seeking to justify it, and so work

in a circle. Not to trust our reason before we have justified

it, is to be, as Hegel said, like the prudent o-xoAaorrt/co? who

would not enter the water till he had first learned to swim.

It is simply impossible by reason to get behind conscious

thought, and our thoughts are, and must be, our only means

of investigating problems however fundamental.

Yet some persons appear to believe that our convictions

even as to self-evident truths may be invalidated on account

of the causes which have, or may have, been at work in

eliciting them. This question forces us to consider the

principle of causation, its nature and effects, in this relation

amongst others ; to that consideration, then, the next chapter

will be devoted.

only be reached by thoughts and must be expressed by the aid

of our thoughts.

We are far indeed from denying that unconscious activities

of various orders take place in our being ; yet, whatever

influence such activities may have, they cannot affect our

judgments save by and in thoughts. Even if a man should

become convinced that his thoughts were worthless tools, he

could only arrive at that conclusion by making use of the

very tools he declared to be worthless. What then ought his

conclusion to be worth even in his own eyes ?

We can never justify reason, because we must employ

reason in criticising and seeking to justify it, and so work

in a circle. Not to trust our reason before we have justified

it, is to be, as Hegel said, like the prudent o-xoAaorrt/co? who

would not enter the water till he had first learned to swim.

It is simply impossible by reason to get behind conscious

thought, and our thoughts are, and must be, our only means

of investigating problems however fundamental.

Yet some persons appear to believe that our convictions

even as to self-evident truths may be invalidated on account

of the causes which have, or may have, been at work in

eliciting them. This question forces us to consider the

principle of causation, its nature and effects, in this relation

amongst others ; to that consideration, then, the next chapter

will be devoted.