CAUSES OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 267

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340 

 

as nothing but the result of habit and associations of images

and ideas, which have become so inveterate that it is quite

impossible for us now to detach ourselves from them.

 

This conception we have, it is hoped, incidentally shown

to be quite insufficient. For how in the first place could

habit give rise to ethical perceptions in beings who were

entirely devoid of them ? How could habit formed amongst

the experiences of life, have enabled us to perceive that true

and absolutely certain conclusions could never be obtained

through premisses which were false or uncertain ? * It is

quite true, of course, that reason is developed and maintained

by complex associations of sensations, images, and ideas, as

it is, in another way, maintained by the food we eat and

the air we breathe. But none of these things, in whatever

combinations, could give rise to intellectual intuitions in

creatures devoid of intellect.

 

Other persons, again, who vehemently repudiate the last-

noticed hypothesis, would have us regard as supremely

certain, the truths which are first recognized by the dawning

intelligence of the child. Only such ideas do they consider

to be what they call " a genuine testimony of consciousness."

But why should truths recognized by a dawning human

intelligence be worth more than those recognized by a man's

intelligence at its full noontide? It is against all our ex-

perience to assert that the ideas of young children are more

true and profound than those of full-grown and well-educated

men. This theory would be utterly absurd but for a con-

ception latent in it and unexpressed, which we think must

be its real, though unavowed, foundation. It is the notion

that the infant mind bears, as it were, the fresh impress of a

divine creator, on which account its dicta should be more

regarded than persuasions of later days, when that mind has

become subjected to the corruptions and delusions prevalent

* See ante, p. 220.

 

 

as nothing but the result of habit and associations of images

and ideas, which have become so inveterate that it is quite

impossible for us now to detach ourselves from them.

 

This conception we have, it is hoped, incidentally shown

to be quite insufficient. For how in the first place could

habit give rise to ethical perceptions in beings who were

entirely devoid of them ? How could habit formed amongst

the experiences of life, have enabled us to perceive that true

and absolutely certain conclusions could never be obtained

through premisses which were false or uncertain ? * It is

quite true, of course, that reason is developed and maintained

by complex associations of sensations, images, and ideas, as

it is, in another way, maintained by the food we eat and

the air we breathe. But none of these things, in whatever

combinations, could give rise to intellectual intuitions in

creatures devoid of intellect.

 

Other persons, again, who vehemently repudiate the last-

noticed hypothesis, would have us regard as supremely

certain, the truths which are first recognized by the dawning

intelligence of the child. Only such ideas do they consider

to be what they call " a genuine testimony of consciousness."

But why should truths recognized by a dawning human

intelligence be worth more than those recognized by a man's

intelligence at its full noontide? It is against all our ex-

perience to assert that the ideas of young children are more

true and profound than those of full-grown and well-educated

men. This theory would be utterly absurd but for a con-

ception latent in it and unexpressed, which we think must

be its real, though unavowed, foundation. It is the notion

that the infant mind bears, as it were, the fresh impress of a

divine creator, on which account its dicta should be more

regarded than persuasions of later days, when that mind has

become subjected to the corruptions and delusions prevalent

* See ante, p. 220.