2 8o THE GROUNDWORK OF SCIENCE
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kind or another. It must have certain qualities and charac-
ters be they what they may. Let us conceive of the most
attenuated and amorphous nebula we can ; it must yet be
quite definite. It must have some composition, some
characters of cohesion and possible resistance, some limits
as to size, and some shape, change as it may from instant
to instant. In reality it is as definite a thing as a plum-
pudding, and it is nothing but a trick of the imagination
which may make it seem not to be so. Less easily perceived
by our sense-organs, and therefore less easy to imagine and
less easy to describe, it certainly is. But less " definite " it no
less certainly is not.
Here then, at the very base, or the very starting-point, of
Mr. Spencer's whole philosophy, lies an absurdity so pro-
found as necessarily to destroy the philosophical value of the
entire system based upon it. And his system agrees with
that " levelling down " method of treating human intelligence
which now demands our attention. We need, however,
occupy but little space here or little of our reader's attention,
if he is already convinced that self-evidence, as recognized
by the intellect, is the supreme and ultimate criterion of the
truth of those propositions which lie at the base of all our
"ordered knowledge" i.e., of all science.
The process of " levelling down " seeks to explain our
highest faculties by our lowest, and to make not intellect but
sense the criterion of our judgments. After what we have
before pointed out, we think it needless to further criticise
that fundamental error which forms a main part of the
system of philosophy which underlies the system known
as Darwinism. Its result, for those who are so unfortunate
as not to have forced their way through it, is to hide from
their intellectual eyesight the objective truth of these
principles which are logically necessary for all science,*
* See ante, Chapter IV.
kind or another. It must have certain qualities and charac-
ters be they what they may. Let us conceive of the most
attenuated and amorphous nebula we can ; it must yet be
quite definite. It must have some composition, some
characters of cohesion and possible resistance, some limits
as to size, and some shape, change as it may from instant
to instant. In reality it is as definite a thing as a plum-
pudding, and it is nothing but a trick of the imagination
which may make it seem not to be so. Less easily perceived
by our sense-organs, and therefore less easy to imagine and
less easy to describe, it certainly is. But less " definite " it no
less certainly is not.
Here then, at the very base, or the very starting-point, of
Mr. Spencer's whole philosophy, lies an absurdity so pro-
found as necessarily to destroy the philosophical value of the
entire system based upon it. And his system agrees with
that " levelling down " method of treating human intelligence
which now demands our attention. We need, however,
occupy but little space here or little of our reader's attention,
if he is already convinced that self-evidence, as recognized
by the intellect, is the supreme and ultimate criterion of the
truth of those propositions which lie at the base of all our
"ordered knowledge" i.e., of all science.
The process of " levelling down " seeks to explain our
highest faculties by our lowest, and to make not intellect but
sense the criterion of our judgments. After what we have
before pointed out, we think it needless to further criticise
that fundamental error which forms a main part of the
system of philosophy which underlies the system known
as Darwinism. Its result, for those who are so unfortunate
as not to have forced their way through it, is to hide from
their intellectual eyesight the objective truth of these
principles which are logically necessary for all science,*
* See ante, Chapter IV.