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340 

 

We have certainly another idea which was never felt, and

that is our idea of " nothing," or " nonentity." It is very

certain that past sensations can never account for that con-

ception, which is nevertheless commonly enough employed.

How often do we not hear such expressions as " It is worth

nothing," or, " There is nothing in it " ?

 

That our powers of mental conception are not tied down

to experience is shown by the very fact that we can conceive

of its not being so tied down, and also that we conceive

of other senses besides those which we possess such, e.g.,

as senses which might enable us to feel the chemical compo-

sition, or the magnetic currents and condition, of different

bodies. We can conceive of possible experiences which are

as remote from being actual as would be perceptions of

colour gained by most carefully listening with the ear, or

musical harmonies detected by specially contrived lenses

carefully fitted to our microscopes.

 

This essential distinction may be further shown by the fact

that one and the same intellectual conception can be initiated

and supported by a variety of very different sets of feelings,

while a single set of feelings may initiate and support a

number of divergent intellectual conceptions. Thus the one

abstract idea, " motion," may be initiated or supported by our

actual experience or mere imagination of (i) the sight of

something traversing our field of vision ; (2) a feeling of

something slipping through the hand ; (3) a sound as of fall-

ing waters ; (4) one like that accompanying the ascent of a

rocket; (5) the sight of a bow and arrow, a musket, or a pile

of cannon balls ; (6) the name of a well-known race-horse ;

(7) dance music from a familiar ballet ; (8) the smell of a fox,

and so on.

 

So also with a single set of feelings, such as those we might

experience after gazing upon a marble statue of Shakespeare:

its aspect, or even our mere recollection of it, might give rise

 

 

We have certainly another idea which was never felt, and

that is our idea of " nothing," or " nonentity." It is very

certain that past sensations can never account for that con-

ception, which is nevertheless commonly enough employed.

How often do we not hear such expressions as " It is worth

nothing," or, " There is nothing in it " ?

 

That our powers of mental conception are not tied down

to experience is shown by the very fact that we can conceive

of its not being so tied down, and also that we conceive

of other senses besides those which we possess such, e.g.,

as senses which might enable us to feel the chemical compo-

sition, or the magnetic currents and condition, of different

bodies. We can conceive of possible experiences which are

as remote from being actual as would be perceptions of

colour gained by most carefully listening with the ear, or

musical harmonies detected by specially contrived lenses

carefully fitted to our microscopes.

 

This essential distinction may be further shown by the fact

that one and the same intellectual conception can be initiated

and supported by a variety of very different sets of feelings,

while a single set of feelings may initiate and support a

number of divergent intellectual conceptions. Thus the one

abstract idea, " motion," may be initiated or supported by our

actual experience or mere imagination of (i) the sight of

something traversing our field of vision ; (2) a feeling of

something slipping through the hand ; (3) a sound as of fall-

ing waters ; (4) one like that accompanying the ascent of a

rocket; (5) the sight of a bow and arrow, a musket, or a pile

of cannon balls ; (6) the name of a well-known race-horse ;

(7) dance music from a familiar ballet ; (8) the smell of a fox,

and so on.

 

So also with a single set of feelings, such as those we might

experience after gazing upon a marble statue of Shakespeare:

its aspect, or even our mere recollection of it, might give rise