PSYCHICAL ANTECEDENTS OF SCIENCE 149

introspection, the interrogation of consciousness, and a con-

sciousness of at least much of our environment. But we

can, through observation and memory, be sure that we must

occasionally have cognized objects with merely sensuous

cognition and without consciousness. And since we can

always argue that what has actually happened must be at

least a possible thing, we may also be sure that merely

sensuous cognition is possible, since we must really have

had it. Without such cognitions the actions above noted as

taking place during reverie and absence of mind could never

be performed.

And the facts we noted in our last chapter ought to make

the occurrence of such merely sensuous actions easy of

comprehension, because they have much resemblance to

those acts of sensuous reflex action and those instinctive

actions which were therein described.

But since such complex instinctive actions, and actions

resulting from sensuous cognition, are the action of the body

as a whole, and as the sensations which give rise to such

sensuous cognitions are often feelings produced by very

different sense organs by sights and sounds, feelings of

touch, pressure, etc. they must clearly be referred to, and

receive responses from, some common sensorium.

Now in the cases referred to consciousness is not called

into play, but is otherwise occupied, and in consequence we

require a term to denote such a faculty and sensorium in

ourselves and in animals, at least in such as all would

agree have not intellectual consciousness. It has then been

suggested to denote that lower psychical faculty, that meeting

together of sensuous impulses of the most diverse kinds, by

the term Consentience.

Sometimes, as both in reverie and a state of absorbed atten-

tion to some object, our minds are in a condition in which

all the direct consciousness of our being seems to be suspended,

introspection, the interrogation of consciousness, and a con-

sciousness of at least much of our environment. But we

can, through observation and memory, be sure that we must

occasionally have cognized objects with merely sensuous

cognition and without consciousness. And since we can

always argue that what has actually happened must be at

least a possible thing, we may also be sure that merely

sensuous cognition is possible, since we must really have

had it. Without such cognitions the actions above noted as

taking place during reverie and absence of mind could never

be performed.

And the facts we noted in our last chapter ought to make

the occurrence of such merely sensuous actions easy of

comprehension, because they have much resemblance to

those acts of sensuous reflex action and those instinctive

actions which were therein described.

But since such complex instinctive actions, and actions

resulting from sensuous cognition, are the action of the body

as a whole, and as the sensations which give rise to such

sensuous cognitions are often feelings produced by very

different sense organs by sights and sounds, feelings of

touch, pressure, etc. they must clearly be referred to, and

receive responses from, some common sensorium.

Now in the cases referred to consciousness is not called

into play, but is otherwise occupied, and in consequence we

require a term to denote such a faculty and sensorium in

ourselves and in animals, at least in such as all would

agree have not intellectual consciousness. It has then been

suggested to denote that lower psychical faculty, that meeting

together of sensuous impulses of the most diverse kinds, by

the term Consentience.

Sometimes, as both in reverie and a state of absorbed atten-

tion to some object, our minds are in a condition in which

all the direct consciousness of our being seems to be suspended,