CAUSES OF SCIENTIFIC KXOU'LEDGE 273
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has been due to what we must call chance that is, not to
any rational cause. The essence of the hypothesis is the
origin of species by the fortuitous action of the destructive
forces of nature on individuals which differ by innate,
indefinite, haphazard variations in all directions. Purposeless
energy is conceived as the cause of the variations, and the
selection of certain kinds is also conceived of as due to
the chance action of physical forces and of other organisms.
By this expression we mean, of course, that the cause of
variation is thus deemed to be not only unknown, but to be
due to no definite law which is the outcome of any kind or
sort of intelligent energy. By this system, then, unreason
may be regarded as practically lord of the universe, and
the source of all the beauties and harmonies which exist in
organic nature.
The above philosophical conception, which underlies the
Darwinian theory, has a very distinct though indirect bear-
ing on Epistemology, as we shall see later on.
We must now return to the consideration of the asserted
genesis by " Natural Selection " of the inevitable character
of our perceptions of an external, extended world. The
main answer to this objection is the answer which we shall
shortly give to all the theories concerning the origin of
human knowledge. It consists in pointing out that what
is supremely important is not the origin of knowledge but
the grounds of knowledge the reasons why it should and
must be confided in and trusted. It is strange that so many
persons should be blind to this fact, which, in our eyes, is
so obvious a truth.
But, putting aside for the present this reply, let us con-
sider whether we possess any knowledge which could not
have been due to the action of "Natural Selection" upon
minute variations in the clearness and extent of our per-
ceptions.
has been due to what we must call chance that is, not to
any rational cause. The essence of the hypothesis is the
origin of species by the fortuitous action of the destructive
forces of nature on individuals which differ by innate,
indefinite, haphazard variations in all directions. Purposeless
energy is conceived as the cause of the variations, and the
selection of certain kinds is also conceived of as due to
the chance action of physical forces and of other organisms.
By this expression we mean, of course, that the cause of
variation is thus deemed to be not only unknown, but to be
due to no definite law which is the outcome of any kind or
sort of intelligent energy. By this system, then, unreason
may be regarded as practically lord of the universe, and
the source of all the beauties and harmonies which exist in
organic nature.
The above philosophical conception, which underlies the
Darwinian theory, has a very distinct though indirect bear-
ing on Epistemology, as we shall see later on.
We must now return to the consideration of the asserted
genesis by " Natural Selection " of the inevitable character
of our perceptions of an external, extended world. The
main answer to this objection is the answer which we shall
shortly give to all the theories concerning the origin of
human knowledge. It consists in pointing out that what
is supremely important is not the origin of knowledge but
the grounds of knowledge the reasons why it should and
must be confided in and trusted. It is strange that so many
persons should be blind to this fact, which, in our eyes, is
so obvious a truth.
But, putting aside for the present this reply, let us con-
sider whether we possess any knowledge which could not
have been due to the action of "Natural Selection" upon
minute variations in the clearness and extent of our per-
ceptions.